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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
LYNN DELL NOREN, Case No. 16018 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction by jury 
verdict for the charge of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable 
Document in violation of §76-6-503, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended, 1973, in the Third Judicial District, the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by jury verdict rendered 
July 17. 1978, and sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for the indeterminate term as provided by law of 0-5 years 
and a fine of $5,000.00 on August 18, 1978. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this cause reversed 
and remanded to the trial court for appropriate action and 
dismissal of the charge set forth in the information. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Of the seven counts originally charged against 
the defendant in the complaint (R. 8-10), six were dismissed 
by the Salt Lake City Court, Judge Robert C. Gibson, for 
insufficient evidence (R. 3-4), leaving the defendant bound 
over to be tried on the charge set forth in the information 
of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable Document, a felony 
of the third degree, in violation of §76-6-503, U.C.A., as 
amended, 1973, to wit: 
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1976, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said 
Lynn Dell Noren Falsified the Articles of 
incorporation of Nordell Financial Services, a 
writing for which the law provides public re-
cording, with the intent to injure or deceive. 
(R. 11) 
Prior to presentation of evidence on behalf of 
the state and pursuant to the Appellant's written motion 
filed with the Court prior to commencement of the pro-
ceedings (R. 56, T. 118) counsel for Appellant presented 
oral argument to quash or dismiss the information by 
reason of its failure to charge the Appellant with an 
offense. Simply pu~ counsel argued that articles of 
incorporation, being documents "filed" with the Secretary 
of State, are not documents "for which the law provides 
public recording." (R. 199-130) 
-2-
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The Court held as a matter of law that the phrase 
.. or other writing for which the law provides public 
recording. " includes within its meaning c, "t"ticle s of 
incorporation and therefore the act of falsifying Articles 
of Incorporation and filing the same with the Secretary of 
State falls within the ambit of the statute charged, §76-6-503 
supra. 
In support of the allegation the State first called 
Raymond Bishop, who testified that the signature of one 
of the incorporators of Nordell Financial Services on its 
Articles of Incorporation (Ex. S-1) purporting to be in his 
hand was in fact not his and that he had given no one authOLity 
to sign his name as an incorporator thereof. (T. 149, 1. 1-13) 
Upon stipulation of counsel the state then introduced 
a transcript of the sworn testimony of Fawn Noren, (Ex. 7-5), 
wherein she stated that she had not signed nor did she recall 
granting authority to anyone to sign her name as an incorporator 
of Nordell Financial Services (Ex. S-1). 
Robert Grube, a handwriting analyst, testified 
for the State that in his opinion the author of the names 
"Fawn Noren" and "Ray Bishop," appearing as incorporators 
of Nordell Financial Services, was the defendant, Lynn Dell 
Noren. 
-3-
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Ron Ferguson testified, without illuminating 
effect as to the merits of the allegation, that he notarized 
the signatures of the three incorporators names: Fawn 
Noren, I.P. Ozawa, and Ray Bishop. (T. 177) 
Attorney Byron Fisher then testified on behalf 
of the State that he prepared the Articles of Incorporation 
(Ex. 1-S) as a result of a conference with the Appellant 
(T. 212-213). Important to the issues presented is the 
following cross-examination of Mr. Fisher: 
Q.: Mr. Fisher, do you know of any limitation, 
as a matter of law, where a principal in filing a 
corporation with the State of Utah must disclose 
in any manner his principalship in that corporation? 
A.: I know of no law that requires that. 
Q.: In other words, if I were to form a corporation 
today, I need not disclose in any manner the fact 
that I am the owner of the corporation because I 
own all of the stock or I will after it is 
incorporated and after it is funded; is that correct? ' 
A.: That is a correct statement and my understanding 
of the law. 
Q.: I need not be a director; is that correct? 
A.: That is correct. 
(T. 217-218) 
Based upon this state of the evidence, the state 
rested its case. (T. 223) Thereupon defense counsel moved 
for a directed verdict on the grounds that the State had failed 
to establish a prima facie case, specifically , that there 
was no evidence of intent to deceive or injure anyone by the ac: 
of falsifying the names on the documents. (T 223-224, 223-226) 
The Court denied this motion. (T. 2 27) 
-4-
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Subsequent to the Appellants defense caseand 
the State's rebuttal, the matter was submitted to the jury as 
charged over the defendant's objection that the matter 
should have gone to the jury not on the felony as charged 
in §76-6-503 supra, but upon the lesser included offence 
contained within §76-6-504, U.C.A. as amended, ~73,-
(T. 391-392). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ARTICLES OF 
INCORPORATION ARE " ... A WRITING FOR WHICH THE 
LAW PROVIDES PUBLIC RECORDING ... " WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF §76-6-504, U.C.A. 1973, AS AMENDED, 
AND FURTHER ERRED IN DENYING APPELL&~T'S MOTION 
TO QUASH OR DISMISS THE INFORMATION FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A PUBLIC OFFENSE. 
There is a crucial distinction between what is 
"recorded" and what is merely "filed", as those terms are 
used in the Statutes of the State of Utah. Specifically 
with regard to Articles of Incorporation the legislature 
has provided that, among the other general duties of the 
Secretary of State, there shall be the requirement as set 
forth in §67-2-2(4), U.C.A., 1975, as amended: 
To record in proper books all conveyances made 
to the state, and to file all articles of 
incorporation entitle~ be filed in his office. 
(emphasis supplied) 
-5-
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Throughout the fourteen subsections §67-2-2, i.d., 
which delineate the various duties of the Secretary of State, 
there is a studied and consistently maintained distinction 
between those items which it is provided shall be filed, 
received, deposited, taken , kept and those which shall be 
recorded. Interpreting the statute it would seem appropriate 
and reasonable to conclude that for those matters upon 
which members of the public might place heavy reliance, 
the legislature provided for recording: conveyances, official 
bonds of state officers, trade-marks. For other matters the 
statute calls fora lesser or different kind of act: filing, 
receiving, keepin~ et cetera. 
The law is clear that Aritcles of Incorporation need 
only be filed and not recorded: 
..... If the Secretary of State finds that the 
articles of incorporation conform to law, he 
shall, when all fees have been paid as in this 
act prescribed: 
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate 
originals the word "filed" and the month, day and 
year of the filing thereof. 
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in 
his office. §16-10-50 U.C.A., 1961 as amended. 
Although Articles of Incorporation may then be a "public 
record", it cannot be said that the law has provided that 
Articles Constitute a "writing for which the law provides 
public recording'' as might be said of a deed, mortgage or 
security instrument. There is no particular emphasis to 
-6-
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be placed on the fact of filing articles of incorporation 
other than that by virtue of filing corporate existence 
comes into being. No particular notice of anything, save 
perhaps the name of the corporation, is imparted and it would 
be facetious to say that anyone, except the most naive, would 
rely upon the names of the incorporators as set forth in the 
filed copy of the articles for any purpose. As the record 
reflects ownership or directorship of the corporation are 
not required by Utah law to be disclosed in any manner so 
that any conflict of interest which might exist would in no way 
be reflected by the articles. 
The only document mentioned in §76-6-503 not like 
a deed, mortgage, or security instrument is a will. Although 
provision is made for deposit of a will with the clerk of 
the court for its confidential safe keeping, §75-2-901, U.C.A., 
1975, as amended, it is not a document for which "the law 
provides public recording". There is an excellent reason for 
this specific inclusion within §76-6-503, i.d. The interest 
in preserving the sanctity of a will, as distinguished 
from almost any other type of document, is great enough to 
warrent treatment of an offender of that sanctity with 
punishment as a felony. The same may be said of a deed, a 
mortgage, a security instrument, or other writing for which 
the law provides public recording as in the instance of an 
-7-
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Agricultural Cooperative Association for which, in contra-
distinction to the garden variety corporation involved in 
the instant matter, it is specifically set forth and 
provided the method of recording. §3-1-6, U.C.A., 1961 as amendedl 
Falsifying names of incorporators on an 
articles of incorporation is not the type of crime intended 
to be or in fact included within the crime charged in the 
information and the charge falls short of fulfilling the 
intendments of §76-6-503, i.d. The information should 
have been quashed or dismissed at trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ SUBMITTING THE CASE TO 
THE JURY AS A FELONY WHERE A CLEAR AND SPECIFIC 
STATUTE CONTROLLING THE SAME CONDUCT EXACTING A 
LESSER PENALTY EXISTS. 
Falsifying, destroying, removing or concealing a 
will or deed are patently more culpable acts than falsifying 
the names of incorporators on an articles of incorporation. 
Commensurate with the lesser degree of culpability the 
legislature provided as follows for punishment as a class 
B misdemeanor the crime of Tampering with Records: 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, 
knowingly falsifies, destroys, removes or conceals 
any writing, other than the writings enumerated in 
section §76-6-503, or record, public or private, 
with intent to deceive or injure any person or to 
conceal any wrong doing is guilty of tampering 
with records. §76-6-504 U.C.A., 1973, amended. 
No doubt articles of incorporation are a public record and 
fall well within the purview of this statute. Certainly to 
the extent that there exists any confusion, the principles 
enunciated by longstanding rules of statutory interpretation 
-8-
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as well as rulings of this court establish the proposition that 
when two statutes encompass like criminal conduct, the more 
specific and clear statute is applicable as well as that con-
taining the lesser penalty. State v. Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 
143, 453 P.2d 146 (1965); State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 
P.2d 168 (1969); Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978). These cases stand 
for the proposition that the clear, specific and lesser penalty 
prescribed shall be applied when two statutes encompass the 
same conduct. In Shondell the Court also stated: 
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule 
that when there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is :applicable to an 
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of 
the lesser. 453 P.2d at 148 
The conclusion follows that appellant was entitled 
to have the case submitted to the jury on §76-6-504 i.d., a 
misdemeanor, rather than §76-6-503, i.d., a felony. 
POINT III 
SECTION 76-6-503(1), AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION 
VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE 14TH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 
l, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Section 76-6-503(1) i.d., at least in its application 
against the appellant herein, violates due process in that it 
is unconstitutionally vague. "It is recognized that a 
reasonable degree of certainty in a criminal statute is an 
essential requirement of due process of law. State v. Minns, 
80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355, 356 (1969) ." 
-9-
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A statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
application violates the first essential of due 
process. Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 u.s. 385, 391 (1926). 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 450 U.S. 
156, 31 L. ed. 2d 110, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972) the Supreme Court 
held a municipal ordinance vague on the basis that the ordinance 
failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
of what acts were proscribed and also because such vague 
enactments encourage arbitrary and erratic arrestsand con-
victions. This concept was expanded in Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 408, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972): 
It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions 
are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several 
important values. First because we assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly 
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing 
fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them. A 
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with 
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. (footnote omitted) 408 U.S. at 108-109. 
In ruling that qrticles of incorporation are a 
writing for which the law provides "public recording", Judge 
Croft hastened to add, "I may be wrong". (T. 12 9) Therein 
lies the problem. There is much question as to what this 
-10-
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"public recording" terminology means. 
The case law in Utah applies the same stadards and 
described factors that a court may consider in determining 
if a statute is unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 560 (1952); Graves v. State, 528 P.2d 
805 (Utah, 1974). 
The statute in question should be held uncon-
stitutionally vague for the reasons set forth herein as well 
as those previously stated in Points I, II, and III. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE 
STATES CASE FOR THE REASON THAT THE STATE FAILED 
TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
The State in its proof failed to marshall sufficient 
evidence to warrant. submi tt:i,ng tre ·matter to .a<jln:)l Reas-onable 
minds could not differ in the opinion that sufficient proof 
of the statutory requirement, "intent to deceive or injure", 
§76-6-503, i.d., was not present to put appellant upon his 
defense or submit the matter to the jury. 
Although an inference may be considered with all 
the other evidence in establishing guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there nevertheless must be sufficient facts adduced 
to entitle the state to have the case go to the jury because 
the evidence is sufficient to counterbalance the general 
-11-
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presumption of innocence Mantell v. Jones, Neb. 36 N.W. 
2d 115; see also State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494, (Utah 1944) 
There was not sufficient evidence to submit this 
case to the jury and the state failed to prove out a 
prima facie case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated Appellant submits 
that this action should be remanded with instructions to 
the Trial Court to dismiss the action or for such other 
relief as may be consistent with Appellant's position as stated 
herein. 
David Bown 
Ronald Yengich 
Herschel Bullen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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office of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, 
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